Martin Luther King Jr.\u27s Lessons for Lawyers in a Time of Market Disruption by Vischer, Robert K.
Valparaiso University Law Review 
Volume 49 
Number 1 Fall 2014 pp.201-217 
Fall 2014 
Martin Luther King Jr.'s Lessons for Lawyers in a Time of Market 
Disruption 
Robert K. Vischer 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Robert K. Vischer, Martin Luther King Jr.'s Lessons for Lawyers in a Time of Market Disruption, 49 Val. U. 
L. Rev. 201 (2015). 
Available at: https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol49/iss1/12 
This Lecture is brought to you for free and open access 
by the Valparaiso University Law School at ValpoScholar. 
It has been accepted for inclusion in Valparaiso 
University Law Review by an authorized administrator of 
ValpoScholar. For more information, please contact a 
ValpoScholar staff member at scholar@valpo.edu. 
 201
Lecture 
MARTIN LUTHER KING JR.’S LESSONS FOR 
LAWYERS IN A TIME OF MARKET 
DISRUPTION 
Robert K. Vischer* 
When I was a second-year litigation associate, I was given my first 
case to manage on my own.  It struck me as a dry, run-of-the-mill breach-
of-contract case turning on the allegedly shoddy production of packaging 
material.  On my first visit to the client’s office, I met with the mid-level 
manager who supervised the manufacturing process that led to the 
complaint’s allegations.  I was planning to spend an hour focusing on our 
discovery plan.  Instead, I spent more than an hour simply listening before 
we started to talk about the specifics of the complaint, much less a 
discovery plan.  The manager needed to tell me his story, sharing how this 
had upset his life, how the allegations threatened his career, and how the 
anxiety had created strain in his family.  Before my knowledge of the 
discovery rules could become a relevant resource, my ability and 
willingness to sympathize with the personal turmoil he was experiencing 
was the most important professional skill I possessed.  Even a “dry” 
contract case required me to step into the shoes of another human being. 
At the time, though, I did not recognize my initial conversations with 
the manager as a core element of professional competence.  I assumed that 
I was stepping out of the attorney’s role until the point when he was ready 
to start talking about the discovery plan, as if engaging him as a person 
was conceptually separable from engaging him as a client.  I bear much of 
the responsibility for my narrow view, but I wonder how my introduction 
into the profession might have contributed to my early conception of the 
lawyer’s work.  Whether “hired gun,” “mouthpiece,” or “photocopier 
technician,” the rhetoric on which our professional narrative is built often 
gives short shift to the thickness of relationship that lies at the center of 
our work, properly understood. 
At the risk of sounding wildly naïve and unrealistic, let me suggest 
that what is too often missing from our conception of the lawyer’s work is 
a rich and full understanding of the human person.  The absence is starkly 
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apparent when one considers the anthropological commitments that 
permeated the work and worldview of Martin Luther King Jr.  Though he 
was not a lawyer, he was an advocate for the interests of others, and he 
was a Christian who was able to live out his beliefs in ways that were 
accessible and influential to those who did not share the underlying 
religious premises.  While King’s moral duties were not constrained by 
the more particular fiduciary duty that lawyers owe to their clients, I 
believe that lawyers overstate the degree to which their moral agency is 
so constrained, and in doing so, abdicate moral responsibility for their 
work.  Lawyers who endeavor to practice with the person at the center, as 
King did, will act as:  (1) subjects; (2) healers; (3) prophets; and (4) realists. 
Let’s take a step back and contextualize this discussion.  As even a 
casual observer knows by now, the legal profession—or perhaps more 
accurately, the legal services market—is in a period of dramatic and 
wrenching change.  Richard Susskind offers some stark prophecies about 
the future of lawyers.1  He focuses on three main drivers of change:  “the 
‘more-for-less’ challenge, liberalization, and information technology.”2  
He argues: 
[R]egarding legal work as bespoke in nature is an 
unhelpful—if often romantic—fiction.  I accept that some 
legal issues that arise do call for the application of acute 
legal minds and the handcrafting of tailored solutions.  
But I believe much less legal work requires bespoke 
treatment than many lawyers would have their clients 
believe.  More than this, I contend that deploying bespoke 
techniques in many instances is to adopt cottage-industry 
methods when mass production and mass customization 
techniques are now available to support the delivery of a 
less costly and yet better service.3 
The legal jobs he sees in the future hardly conjure up images of Atticus 
Finch:  legal knowledge engineer, legal technologist, legal process analyst, 
and legal project manager.4  All trends seem decidedly against a more 
person-centered approach to practice. The focus is currently on efficiency, 
                                                 
1 RICHARD SUSSKIND, TOMORROW’S LAWYERS:  AN INTRODUCTION TO YOUR FUTURE 3 
(2013). 
2 Id. 
3 Id. at 24. 
4 Id. at 111; see HARPER LEE, TO KILL A MOCKINGBIRD 4–5 (referencing a main character 
from Harper Lee’s book whose profession was a lawyer). 
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streamlining the process, and avoiding unnecessarily “bespoke” 
provisions of legal services.5 
Susskind’s forecast not only stands in tension with King’s model of 
the trusted counselor and advocate, but also with a more lawyer-specific 
prescription offered twenty years ago by Anthony Kronman.  In his 
widely discussed book, The Lost Lawyer, Kronman lamented the fact that, 
from his vantage point in the early 1990s, he was witnessing the demise of 
“the belief that the outstanding lawyer—the one who serves as a model 
for the rest—is not simply an accomplished technician but a person of 
prudence or practical wisdom as well.”6  As this ideal receded from view, 
Kronman worried that “lawyers will find it harder to believe their work 
provides intrinsic fulfillment of any kind” and thus will conclude “that 
their yearning to be engaged in some lifelong endeavor that has value in 
its own right can no longer be satisfied in their professional work.”7  
Kronman was generally prescient, but there is one point on which he 
might have been overly optimistic.  “Of course,” he emphasized, “the 
external benefits of law practice remain as obvious as before.”8  Kronman 
presumed that the lost ideals of the profession are bad for the lawyer’s 
ability to derive meaning from legal practice and for the country’s 
traditional reliance on lawyers as statesmen.9 
What if, though, the failure to reclaim this traditional lawyer’s role not 
only hurt the lawyer’s ability to derive meaning from her work and 
contribute to the social good, but also made lawyers expendable?10  Did 
the loss of what Kronman referred to as “the lawyer-statesman” ideal give 
rise to a conception of the lawyer’s role which made that role susceptible 
to market-driven obsolescence?11 
Note that I am not suggesting that Susskind’s forecast is wrong; he is 
undoubtedly better at this sort of prediction than I am.  But the future he 
predicts is not static nor is the outcome certain.  He recognizes that there 
will still be a place for personal, face-to-face legal counseling; he just does 
not think there will be much place for it.12  But surely lawyers have some 
capacity to shape the dynamic, even if the future is not entirely in our 
                                                 
5 SUSSKIND, supra note 1, at 24. 
6 ANTHONY KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER:  FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION 2 
(1993). 
7 Id. at 3. 
8 Id. 
9 Id. at 3–4. 
10 Thanks to my colleague Jerry Organ for helpful conversations developing this line of 
thought. 
11 KRONMAN, supra note 6, at 3. 
12 See SUSSKIND, supra note 1, at 10–14 (discussing how technology in the profession will 
alter the way lawyers will handle their business). 
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hands.  Indeed, there is some evidence that we are already failing to 
provide law students with the broad range of competencies that legal 
employers want.13  If we train lawyers only to be technicians, if lawyers 
conceive of themselves as only technicians, it will be harder for clients to 
know what they might be missing when they ask their lawyers to function 
only as technicians. 
What is the alternative?  Kronman’s understanding of the lawyer-
statesman entails legal work that begins and ends in relationship.  He 
referred to the quality of judgment that lawyers must possess as one of 
“imaginative sympathy,” which includes both compassion and 
detachment.14  “To ensure that he remains sufficiently detached to survey 
the alternatives from a vantage point different from any of their own 
internal points of view,” according to Kronman, “it is necessary that he 
hold something in reserve even while making a maximum effort at 
sympathetic understanding.”15 
Lawyers who follow King’s example and Kronman’s advice will act 
as subjects, not as objects.  In other words, they become an active 
participant in a dynamic relationship—a subject—not a passive vessel or 
conduit for client demands.  Kronman emphasized that both counseling 
and advocacy roles caution that “a lawyer cannot be the mere minister to 
[the client’s] ambition that the narrow view portrays him as being,” for 
both roles demand “practical wisdom,” not just “technical knowledge.”16  
Lawyers give voice to their clients, without a doubt, but a lawyer is more 
than a mouthpiece.  A lawyer dedicated to the client’s best interests will 
not presume to equate the client’s well-being with the maximization of her 
independence and autonomy. 
King regularly offered agape as the model for engaging a world that 
was hostile to the goals of the civil rights movement.17  “Agape” is the 
term used in the Bible to denote sacrificial love, in contrast to “phileo,” 
which focuses more on the lover’s feelings for another, rather than on how 
the lover can meet the other’s needs.18  When we love those “who oppose 
                                                 
13 See Neil W. Hamilton, Changing Markets Create Opportunities:  Emphasizing the 
Competencies Legal Employers Use in Hiring New Lawyers (Including Professional 
Formation/Professionalism), 65 S.C. L. REV. 547, 552–53 (reporting survey data showing that 
both large and small law firms consider trustworthiness, strong relationships, ability to 
inspire confidence, and good judgment as “[v]ery [i]mportant to [c]ritically [i]mportant”). 
14 KRONMAN, supra note 6, at 72. 
15 Id. 
16 Id. at 134. 
17 MARTIN LUTHER KING JR., A TESTAMENT OF HOPE:  THE ESSENTIAL WRITINGS AND 
SPEECHES OF MARTIN LUTHER KING JR. 8–9 (James Melvin Washington ed., 1986) [hereinafter 
A TESTAMENT OF HOPE]. 
18 Id. at 8. 
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us,” according to King, we speak of agape.19  Agape “is the love of God 
working in the lives of men,” and thus “[w]hen we love on the agape level 
we love men not because we like them, not because their attitudes and 
ways appeal to us, but because God loves them.”20  The key for King was 
that agape is a “disinterested love” in the sense that “[i]t is a love in which 
the individual seeks not his own good, but the good of his neighbor,” and 
does not discriminate “between worthy and unworthy people” or based 
on “any qualities people possess.”21  The importance of these demands for 
the civil rights movement is obvious, and King made it explicit by 
asserting that “the best way to assure oneself that love is disinterested is 
to have love for the enemy-neighbor from whom you can expect no good 
in return, but only hostility and persecution.”22 
Crucially, agape itself springs from the loved one’s needs.23  Loving 
the white man, according to King, was a response to the white man’s 
needs, for “his soul [was] greatly scarred” by segregation.24  “[T]he white 
man need[ed] [the] love [of the African American] to remove his tensions, 
insecurities, and fears.”25  Even within the black community of his own 
city, King showed that love is not passive—it pushes and challenges.  King 
worked to motivate the community to organize and persist in the 
Montgomery bus boycott.26  In leading the boycott, King asked his 
followers to look beyond the hardship it entailed over months of walking, 
and by saying this, he was not acting as a passive conduit for the 
community’s stated preferences.27  He later wrote that the people, even 
though they were “exhausted by the humiliating experiences that they 
had constantly faced on the buses . . . came to see that it was ultimately 
more honorable to walk the streets in dignity than to ride the buses in 
humiliation.”28 
King’s approach resonates with Kronman, who emphasized that the 
lawyer must assess the client’s judgment from “the perspective of the 
client’s own interests,” which requires the lawyer “to place himself in the 
client’s position by provisionally accepting his ends and then 
imaginatively considering the consequences of pursuing them, with the 
                                                 
19 Id. 
20 Id. at 8–9. 
21 Id. at 19 (citation omitted). 
22 Id. 
23 A TESTAMENT OF HOPE, supra note 17, at 19. 
24 Id.  
25 Id. 
26 Id. at 425. 
27 Id. at 425–28. 
28 MARTIN LUTHER KING JR., STRENGTH TO LOVE 150 (Fortress Press Ed. 1981) [hereinafter 
STRENGTH TO LOVE]. 
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same combination of sympathy and detachment the lawyer would 
employ if he were deliberating on his own account.”29  King put his own 
being into the shoes of his congregants—acknowledging the hardship 
caused by walking miles back and forth to work every day—but he 
pushed them to embrace a reality that may have laid beyond their view at 
the time. 
Agape’s lessons for lawyers will go nowhere unless lawyers actually 
conceive of themselves as subjects, a task that is easier said than done.  
They are not empty vessels or mere extensions of the client’s autonomy.  
To be sure, lawyers must also acknowledge their clients as subjects.  
Replacing the “lawyer as mouthpiece” paradigm by elevating the lawyer’s 
own moral convictions as a trump card over the client’s own commitments 
and priorities does not further agape.  Lawyers must guard against 
overreaching and remain cognizant of the power disparity in many 
attorney-client relationships, especially when clients are not sophisticated 
in legal analysis or experienced with the intricacies of the legal system.  If 
the lawyer and client are both subjects, they will act as partners in a moral 
dialogue and remain open to the possibility that their partner in the 
endeavor may teach them something. 
Pushing back against the view of the “lawyer as mouthpiece” is only 
possible if trust finds fertile ground in the relationship.  The client must 
trust that the attorney has the client’s best interests at heart, and that 
widening the conversation to encompass considerations beyond the 
maximization of the client’s legal rights and privileges need not invariably 
function as an entryway for the attorney’s own interests.  The attorney 
must trust the client enough to listen authentically, to step beyond her 
own assumptions long enough to encounter the client as a subject, not as 
an object, and to question whether her own perspective accurately reflects 
the client’s best interests.  The attorney-client relationship requires mutual 
trust because approaching the other as a subject requires mutual 
vulnerability. 
Trust in the legal profession is under tremendous strain right now 
given market dynamics and pressure to become less distinct from other 
business service providers.30  Large law firms have arguably become less 
conducive to trust. As they grow more dependent on mergers and lateral 
hiring, they compromise their ability to build a culture shaped by 
nonmonetary values.  Steven Harper cites an end-of-year email from the 
                                                 
29 KRONMAN, supra note 6, at 130. 
30 See Robert K. Vischer, Big Law and the Marginalization of Trust, 25 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 
165, 187 (2012) (explaining that the legal profession is currently transitioning from “trusting 
in” to “trusting that”). 
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chair of global law firm K&L Gates to the firm’s partners spread over 
forty-eight worldwide offices: 
Many of you came from different cultures.  I don't care 
about your prior acculturation. . . . We are a US-based 
global law firm.  US law firms operate on a cash basis of 
accounting.  Our fees must be collected by midnight 
within the fiscal year in which they are due. . . . I couldn't 
care less whether it appeals to you.  It is who we are and 
therefore it is who you are.31 
If pursuit of the bottom line is the only value shared among partners, 
trust may be in short supply, for trust does not flourish apart from 
relationships.  A lack of trust among lawyers can impair trust between 
lawyer and client, for studies show “that trust and distrust are 
contagious.”32  Technology can put additional strain on trust, but need not 
crowd out the trust-facilitating bond that can develop between lawyer and 
client.  As John McGinnis and Russ Pearce point out, relationships of trust 
“allow the lawyer to facilitate clients to see their long-term legal self-
interest, even when clients’ passions and confusions cloud that interest.”33  
They continue by stating, “[m]achines are unlikely to perform this 
bonding function and, thus, will be unlikely to substantially affect this 
important aspect of the lawyer-client relationship.”34  Lawyers committed 
to agape may not be able to change firm cultures single-handedly, but they 
will remain cognizant of the importance of trust as they build 
relationships with both colleagues and clients.  Technology stands to 
transform much of the legal services industry.35 
Agape not only helps prevent the attorney and client from being 
isolated from each other, but it can also help the attorney avoid the 
mistake of presuming that the client is isolated from others.  King’s 
invocation of agape was geared toward the neighbor’s development of 
closer human relationships—breaking down walls between enemies and 
encouraging the shared pursuit of higher purposes among friends.36  To 
understand why, we need to account for King’s belief in the 
                                                 
31 STEVEN HARPER, THE LAWYER BUBBLE:  A PROFESSION IN CRISIS 118 (2013). 
32 Vischer, supra note 30, at 176. 
33 John O. McGinnis & Russell G. Pearce, The Great Disruption:  How Machine Intelligence 
Will Transform the Role of Lawyers in the Delivery of Legal Services, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 3041, 
3055 (2014). 
34 Id. 
35 SUSSKIND, supra note 1, at 10–14; see also Theresa A. Gabaldon, Virtual Virtuous Living:  
How Can The I-Generation of Lawyers Best Love And Serve Its Neighbors?, 43 VAL. U. L. REV. 1045, 
1047–61 (2009) (discussing how technology is further transforming the legal profession). 
36 A TESTAMENT OF HOPE, supra note 17, at 19–20. 
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interconnectedness of humanity and the unifying narrative of the 
universe. 
In one of the most famous lines from his Letter from Birmingham Jail, 
King proclaimed that “[i]njustice anywhere is a threat to justice 
everywhere.”37  He did not mean that injustice unchecked will eventually 
affect everyone; instead he was making the more radical claim that 
injustice anywhere harms the human community to which we all belong.  
As he put it in another context, “[w]e are [all] caught in an inescapable 
network of mutuality, tied in[to] a single garment of destiny[, and thus,] 
[w]hatever affects one directly, affects all indirectly.”38  This view of the 
world, which emanates from a theological tradition called personalism, 
fundamentally shaped his witness, as he worked tirelessly to repair the 
breach in what he referred to as “the beloved community.”39  In a real 
sense, King was a healer. 
Viewing King’s work as a ministry of healing can help underscore its 
distinctiveness.  His advocacy for the law’s expansion and enforcement of 
individual rights was not geared toward the maximization of autonomy, 
as today’s rights rhetoric often seems to be.  King instead looked to rights 
as tools to help repair the breach in the human community.40  His work to 
enhance the legal and political standing of the individual was inseparable 
from his work to restore the human community. 
Agape teaches lawyers to treat their clients, and themselves, as 
subjects, not objects.41  However, personalism broadens the relational 
view, challenging lawyers to recognize their potential role as healers—
counselors who can help repair breaches in the human community.42  
Personalism speaks not only to the way we relate to our clients, but also 
to the way we would hope our clients relate to others.43  A lawyer should 
not operate from the presumption that the default function of legal 
representation is to maximize the client’s self-interest, as defined in 
narrow, individualist terms. 
For example, the collapse of Enron was made more likely by lawyers 
who were too willing to figure out a way to accomplish whatever their 
client expressed a desire to do, rather than stepping back and having a 
                                                 
37 Id. at 290. 
38 Id. 
39 IRA G. ZEPP, JR., THE SOCIAL VISION OF MARTIN LUTHER KING JR. 193–94, 209 (1989) 
(footnote omitted). 
40 See, e.g., A TESTAMENT OF HOPE, supra note 17, at 423–29 (providing one example, the 
Montgomery bus boycott, of how Martin Luther King used rights to correct flaws in the 
community). 
41 Id. at 19–20. 
42 ZEPP, supra note 39, at 194. 
43 Id. 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 49, No. 1 [2015], Art. 12
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol49/iss1/12
2014] Lessons for Lawyers 209 
conversation about what should be done.44  Enron’s lawyers appear to 
have offered little resistance to, or reflection on, the path charted by 
Enron’s management.45  This acquiescence prevented the lawyers from 
helping Enron executives take a broader view of the company’s interests.  
Personalism’s lessons are not that Enron’s investors must sacrifice their 
profits for the greater good, but from the personalist perspective, Enron’s 
own interests are invariably wrapped up with, though not always 
identical to, the interests of its investors, employees, customers, and 
members of the surrounding community.  The fact that devotion to short-
term share price has proven to be a recipe for disaster would not surprise 
King, who insisted on the empirical reality of the human community.46 
Just as lawyers need to engage clients as subjects, lawyers should 
encourage clients to view third parties as subjects, not as objects.  This does 
not just speak to the lawyer’s view of the third party, but also speaks to 
the lawyer’s view of the client.  For example, the lawyer should not treat 
the client as isolated from the rest of the human community.  We are not 
talking about the ultimate direction of the representation, because the 
lawyer owes deference to the client first.  If the client persists with an 
isolating and narrow conception of her self-interest, then the lawyer’s only 
choice is to withdraw or abide by the client’s direction.  The important 
point is for the lawyer to have the conversation with the client, not to 
hijack the representation.  The conversation itself may look different 
depending on the context.  For instance, a lawyer committed to treating 
her client as a subject must also remain cognizant of power disparities in 
the relationship.  A lawyer reminds a client of her relational commitments 
in different ways depending on the length of the relationship, the scope of 
the matters involved, and the client’s dependence on the lawyer as the 
only practical source of legal services, among other factors. 
So, we know King practiced agape and that he was a healer.47  
Furthermore, King was a prophet.  He advocated for a natural, moral law 
as an impetus for legal and social reform.48  Most famously, in his Letter 
from Birmingham Jail, King applied the moral law to critique segregation:  
“Any law that uplifts human personality is just.  Any law that degrades 
human personality is unjust.  All segregation statutes are unjust because 
segregation distorts the soul and damages the personality.  It gives the 
                                                 
44 See ROBERT K. VISCHER, MARTIN LUTHER KING JR. AND THE MORALITY OF LEGAL 
PRACTICE: LESSONS IN LOVE AND JUSTICE 94–97 (2013) [hereinafter MARTIN LUTHER KING JR. 
AND THE MORALITY OF LEGAL PRACTICE] (analyzing the problems that led to Enron’s demise). 
45 Id. 
46 A TESTAMENT OF HOPE, supra note 17, at 36–37, 293 (discussing King’s view on 
liberalism, neo-orthodoxy, and existentialism). 
47 Id. at 256; ZEPP, supra note 39, at 194. 
48 A TESTAMENT OF HOPE, supra note 17, at 293. 
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segregator a false sense of superiority and the segregated a false sense of 
inferiority.”49 
King’s worldview formed his prophetic stance.  Respect for the 
human person serves as the benchmark for justice.  A lack of respect not 
only denies the dignity of the person disrespected, but also of the person 
who failed to show respect.  The call to justice is about more than lifting 
up the marginalized and oppressed; it is about restoring the relationships 
that are breached by marginalization and oppression and connecting us 
all as mutually-dependent beings.  King, the prophet, calls for justice by 
calling to restore community. 
A lawyer who embraces King’s prophetic ethics will speak truth to 
power.  This is difficult to capture in regulatory reforms or discrete action 
items.  The implications are broader and deeper in two ways.  First, 
prophetic lawyers call the client to confront reality, including the reality 
of the human community, despite how torn and frayed it might be.  The 
client has a role to play, and a prophetic lawyer can—with due deference 
toward the client as ultimate decision-maker—remind the client of that 
role.  For example, John Yoo ignored the reality of the human community 
when he advised the Bush Administration that torture might be 
permissible under the necessity defense because “any harm that might 
occur during an interrogation would pale to insignificance compared to 
the harm avoided by preventing [a terrorist] attack.”50  Yoo ignored the 
reality of the human community, labeling torture “insignifican[t]” because 
the harm avoided casts another human being as a means to an end, 
regardless of whether torture can ever be justified.51  In these, and less 
dramatic episodes, lawyers too often facilitate their clients’ stated 
objectives by pushing third parties to the margins of the human 
community, or at least to the margins of the client’s cognizance of the 
human community. 
Second, prophetic lawyers call the legal profession to confront reality 
and to imagine its role in repairing the human community.  Occasionally, 
this requires lawyers to adopt a confrontational stance toward the 
profession.  Tom Shaffer believes that the Hebrew prophets “would say 
that the trouble with us [lawyers] is not that we tend to be uncivil to one 
another,” but rather, “[t]hey might say that we are too civil, civil to the 
wrong people, civil in the wrong direction.”52  Our real problem might be 
                                                 
49 Id. 
50 Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Office of the Assistant Attorney General, to Alberto 
R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President 41 (Aug. 1, 2002), http://fl1.findlaw.com/ 
news.findlaw.com/wp/docs/doj/bybee80102mem.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/S7DF-
78R4?type=pdf. 
51 Id. 
52 Thomas L. Shaffer, Lawyers as Prophets, 15 ST. THOM. L. REV. 469, 470 (2003). 
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that “we are not angry enough.”53  What if the profession stepped back 
from its relentless quest to prevent nonlawyers from providing any 
service that could remotely be construed as “practicing law,” put 
economic protectionism firmly to the side, and instead focused on the 
public’s well-being by balancing the need for affordable services against 
the need for attorney-client relationship protections?  A prophetic lawyer 
must recognize that associations can be every bit as self-absorbed as 
individuals, and even more socially corrosive. 
Finally, King was a Christian realist; a tradition that dates back to 
Augustine.54  King was heavily influenced by the leading twentieth-
century figure in Christian realism, Reinhold Niebuhr.55  In King’s words, 
“Niebuhr made me aware of the complexity of human motives and the 
reality of sin on every level of man’s existence,” including “the glaring 
reality of collective evil.”56  Niebuhr emphasized the persistence of 
inordinate self-love as the root of suffering that marks the human 
condition.57 
Many lawyers work to keep morality out of their client relationships 
because they are skeptical about their ability to be neutral, objective 
arbiters.  This skepticism results in a less-than-inspiring vision of the 
lawyer’s role.  Law is a complicated machine, and lawyers need to make 
sure it runs, but what it is used for is none of the lawyer’s business.  King 
and Niebuhr might urge lawyers not to permit realism to slide into 
cynicism.  Their realism included affirmative claims about the nature of 
the human person and the responsibilities that flow from it.58  
Accordingly, lawyers who take their client’s interests seriously may need 
to reconsider their reluctance to raise moral considerations. 
Further, we need not rely solely on the claims in the abstract—we can 
see Christian realism lived out in King’s work.  As a public advocate in 
the prophetic tradition, King displayed unwavering commitment to the 
                                                 
53 Id. 
54 See MARTIN LUTHER KING JR. AND THE MORALITY OF LEGAL PRACTICE, supra note 44, at 
31 (discussing the origin of Christian realism from St. Augustine and Reinhold Niebuhr’s 
modern influence); STRENGTH TO LOVE, supra note 28, at 135–36 (explaining Christian realism 
in further detail). 
55 STRENGTH TO LOVE, supra note 28, at 135–36. 
56 Id. 
57 REINHOLD NIEBUHR, THE ESSENTIAL REINHOLD NIEBUHR:  SELECTED ESSAYS AND 
ADDRESSES 169 (Robert McAfee Brown ed., 1986). 
58 See, e.g., id. at 169 (“there is no level of human moral or social achievement in which 
there is not some corruption of inordinate self-love”); STRENGTH TO LOVE, supra note 28, at 
136 (“I am now convinced that the truth about man is found neither in liberalism nor in neo-
orthodoxy. . . . Protestant liberalism defined man only in terms of his essential nature, his 
capacity for good; neo-orthodoxy tended to define man only in terms of his existential 
nature, his capacity for evil.”). 
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common good.  He was under no professional compulsion to place a 
particular client’s interests above those of the broader community.  
However, his advocacy reflected a view of reality that changes the 
assumptions we make about an individual’s best interests, especially 
within the attorney-client relationship. 
King was optimistic about the arc of history, but his optimism was not 
the sort that allowed him to sit back and watch society’s natural tendencies 
work themselves out over time.  King credited Niebuhr’s work for helping 
him see liberalism’s sentimentality and false idealism.59  Particularly 
problematic was the notion that education would eventually eradicate 
racism through intellectual enlightenment, given the unavoidable fact that 
“reason is darkened by sin.”60  As such, humans have an uncanny ability 
“to use our minds to rationalize our actions,” and thus, liberals need to 
recognize that “reason by itself is little more than an instrument to justify 
man’s defensive ways of thinking.”61  As King explained in an interview, 
“the most pervasive mistake I have made was in believing that because 
our cause was just, we could be sure that the white ministers of the South, 
once their Christian consciences were challenged, would rise to our aid.”62  
Alternatively, King resisted focusing exclusively on the human capacity 
for evil by striving to keep both good and evil in view.63  King knew that 
the capacity for good made his struggle for civil rights possible, but the 
capacity for evil made the struggle necessary. 
“Christian realism is premised on a pair of anthropological claims:  (1) 
humans are sinful and therefore fallible, but (2) humans are social and 
therefore accountable.”64  Lawyers tend to focus on the first while ignoring 
the second.  Our own fallibility cautions lawyers against denying the 
client’s moral agency or delegating their own moral agency to the 
profession as a whole.  Our social nature reminds lawyers that the 
maximization of a client’s legal rights may not always be in keeping with 
the client’s best interests. 
There are broader lessons here.  To the extent that our political and 
legal discourse marginalizes moral considerations or reflects a conception 
of the human person as an isolated bundle of rights and interests, we are 
not only jeopardizing the common good—we are defying reality.  Niebuhr 
and King may be able to help lawyers dispel the apparent conflict between 
individual autonomy and social accountability. 
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Lawyers, in their more noble moments, will defend an amoral 
conception of lawyering on the ground that it checks lawyers’ temptations 
to favor their own interests over the interests of their clients.  This 
skepticism toward the lawyer’s ability to check her own self-interest also 
shapes the profession’s regulatory framework.  For example, the 
profession forbids—and will punish—the attorney from accepting certain 
representations that create conflicts of interest, even if there is no showing 
of actual harm to the client.  We do not want lawyers to put themselves in 
a position where their own interests will tempt them to give less than 
zealous representation to the client.  We do not defer to the lawyer who 
objects, “but I am a self-disciplined person who can rise above my own 
interests and serve my client!”  “No,” the profession responds, “the will 
to power can never be adequately checked, so we will take the decision 
out of your hands.”  Niebuhr might be pleased by this line of thinking. 
The problem is that this healthy skepticism is often insufficient to 
overcome the profession’s devotion to the economic interests of lawyers.  
Several years ago, the ABA revised its conflicts rule to permit a firm to 
overcome a conflict by screening the conflicted lawyer from the case, so a 
lawyer representing a plaintiff in a lawsuit could be hired by the 
defendant’s firm in the middle of the case, and that firm could still 
represent the defendant against the plaintiff even though the plaintiff’s 
lawyer is now part of the firm.65  The ABA will defend the rule as a 
prudent acknowledgment of lawyer mobility, and will urge critics to trust 
firms’ ability to screen effectively.  The curious fact is that the ABA rejected 
this proposal several times in the past, but in the midst of the worst 
economic downturn in years in the legal profession, the profession made 
it substantially easier for lawyers to get hired even when a conflict would 
traditionally have prevented it. 66  Niebuhr might notice a bit of self-
interest moving the levers of power. 
The more fundamental problem, though, is that the skeptical side of 
realism is as far as some of the modern legal profession’s self-conception 
gets, but it is not as far as Niebuhr went.  As did King, Niebuhr explored 
the relationship between love and justice.67  “For Niebuhr, the norm that 
                                                 
65 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.10 (2015), available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/publications/model_r
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66 See Carolyn B. Lamm, Staying on Message, A.B.A. J., Jan. 2010, at 8 (defending the 
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are affected by the recession”). 
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continues to call humans to further achievement is the law of agape:  the 
demand to express sacrificial love for all humans, even when they do not 
reciprocate.”68  Further, he observed that “love is the law of life, even when 
people do not live by the law of love,” and that justice can “prove to men 
and nations that there are limits beyond which their rebellion cannot 
go.”69  At the same time, justice will not bring repentance “if love does not 
shine through the justice,” which does not happen unless and until the 
punished behold “the executor of judgment suffering with and for the 
victim.”70  Those who strive for perfection learn that “perfection is love 
and not justice,” and thereby “obtain mercy while they learn to be 
merciful.”71  Those who “imagine themselves righteous,” by contrast, “are 
consistently condemned.”72 
The elusiveness of justice does not excuse a failure to seek it.  “Niebuhr 
never used his realism to excuse hopelessness or inaction.”73  He urged 
Christians, despite their knowledge of human sinfulness, to overcome the 
temptation “to disavow their own responsibility for a tolerable justice in 
the world’s affairs.”74  Justice can be an imperfect approximation of the 
law of love.  As such, justice can be a more authentic measure of love than 
the “insufferable sentimentality,” which has afflicted the Church through 
the years, as though the world’s problems would be solved “if only men 
would love one another.”75  While “love may be the motive of social 
action,” Christians must recognize that justice is “the instrument of love 
in a world in which self-interest is bound to defy the canons of love on 
every level.”76 
One reason why realism did not weaken King’s commitment to justice 
is that his realism had a firm foundation, which is not simply teetering on 
the abyss of a bottomless skepticism.  “As a realist, Niebuhr emphasized 
the importance of grounding our worldview on an accurate 
understanding of the human person, including the social and 
transcendent dimensions of human nature.”77  We are not freestanding 
bundles of legal interests waiting to be maximized; instead, we are 
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relational in that human nature entails our fulfillment in the lives of 
others. 
Christian realist lawyers are working toward the good, alongside our 
clients, and we are capable of entering into relationships with our clients 
centered on certain understandings that flow from our shared human 
nature.  One such understanding is that our clients themselves are social 
beings who are accountable to other social beings.  In other words, the 
starting point for the attorney-client relationship should not be the 
assumption that the client wishes to maximize her own legal interests 
without accounting for her social commitments and obligations. 
The realist’s awareness of the corrupting power of excessive self-love 
means that skepticism is necessary.  Blind deference to the justice of “the 
system” is never in order.  Realist lawyers in the molds of Niebuhr and 
King know love should not shun power, and power should not shun love.  
Lawyers shun power when they abdicate responsibility for justice to a 
professional interest group.  They shun love when they equate justice with 
rights, and forget that rights are the means for restoring just relationships.  
Lawyers must account for a fallen world in our understanding of our 
professional roles.  A lawyer cannot ignore the power dimension of legal 
practice or the profession’s capacity to dress up its own interests as the 
public interest.  Realist lawyers take to heart Niebuhr’s caution that 
privileged groups engage in pervasive self-deception and consistently 
identify their own interests as universal. 
Legal ethicists are wise to incorporate the fallible nature of lawyers 
into their traditional justification of the lawyer’s role.  However, they may 
be overemphasizing one dimension of that fallibility while largely 
disregarding other dimensions.  Prudent concern for the client-directed 
nature of legal representation should not be allowed to obscure the 
importance of moral engagement between lawyer and client.  No lawyer 
has a monopoly on moral truth so as to justify silencing the client or 
subverting the rule of law.  The potential for moral engagement to be 
abused does not change the need for engagement.  King’s realism always 
brought to light aspects of our life together that we may prefer to ignore.  
For the legal profession, one such aspect is the fact that technically 
proficient legal advice will not always serve the client’s interests fully. 
At the same time, our fallen human condition is relevant to the 
lawyer’s work.  Indeed, our fallen condition may tend to reveal itself 
among people who are drawn to the practice of law differently than it does 
in others.  Lawyers’ tendency to define themselves by their intellectual 
achievements, their perfectionism, and their drive to win can foster 
unhealthy isolation, an avoidance of vulnerability, and a fear-driven self-
reliance.  Large law firms have realized the awesome profit-maximizing 
Vischer: Martin Luther King Jr.'s Lessons for Lawyers in a Time of Market
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2015
216 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49 
power unleashed by building a permanent competition among highly 
driven individuals who are afraid to fail.  For reasons reflected in the 
travails of John Gellene, Joseph Collins, Enron, and others, it is unclear 
whether unleashing this power serves either the rule of law or client well-
being.78  Instead of accounting for the reality of lawyers’ fallen nature, 
some aspects of modern legal practice may capitalize on that fallen nature 
in the pursuit of short-term interests.  For both lawyers and clients, 
ignoring the reality of our social nature is a costly proposition. 
Both King and Niebuhr saw law’s power to serve as a needed bulwark 
against the tendency of inordinate self-love to bring alienation and 
disconnection to the human condition.  The starting point for the attorney-
client relationship should not be the assumption that the client wishes to 
maximize her own legal interests without accounting for her social 
commitments and obligations.  The importance of acknowledging the 
social dimension of a client’s nature, and correspondingly, her well-being, 
is not limited to headline-grabbing cases.  When a client asks his lawyer 
to help negotiate the settlement terms of his divorce, decide how 
aggressively to interpret applicable environmental regulations, comply 
with arguable disclosure obligations in a real property sale, or write a 
hostile letter to the opposing counsel, the lawyer has a choice.  She can 
start from one of two premises:  (1) that the client’s interests should be 
defined narrowly in terms directly traceable to the client’s immediate and 
tangible benefit; or (2) that the client’s interests include an account of her 
decision’s impact on those with whom she is in a relationship.  The realist 
lawyer will not push the client toward certain results—to do so would be 
to ignore both the client’s dignity and the lawyer’s fallibility—but she will 
avoid assumptions about the client’s nature that defy reality, including the 
social nature of the human person. 
The realist lawyer cannot defer to the ABA for a proper accounting of 
reality, much less for an account of how the law of love can be reflected in 
our pursuit of justice.  It depends on the lawyer to take reality seriously.  
The Christian realism, championed by Niebuhr and King, takes an 
unflinching view of the fallen person.  Yet, lawyers are missing the point 
if they conclude that the fall totally obscures the person.  The flight from 
relationships—both ours and those of the client’s—is a flight from reality 
and realism. 
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If we are tempted to dismiss King’s example as hopelessly ambitious 
for today’s lawyers, perhaps we are setting our expectations too low as a 
profession.  As Kronman reminds us: 
[O]ne important element in a group’s claim to 
professional status has very often been the belief that the 
work its members do engages a sufficiently broad range 
of human capabilities to have a transformative effect on 
the members’ personalities, to shape their identities in a 
lasting way by promoting the development of a 
distinctive professional character.79 
Will the market erode—or has it already eroded—our distinctive 
professional character? 
The qualities of character modeled by King—subject, healer, prophet, 
and realist—set the bar high indeed.  Are all those roles needed in any 
given case?  Of course not.  Sometimes technical expertise is all that is 
required.  Nonetheless, if we presume that lawyers bring nothing else to 
the table, clients have no reason to expect more than technical expertise.  
As Susskind reminds us, that which can be disaggregated and divided 
among the lowest bidders as discrete tasks tends to short -circuit any role 
that would require coherent—much less comprehensive—knowledge of 
the client and her overarching needs and interests.  Kronman diagnosed 
the disease twenty years ago, but he may not have realized that it was 
potentially fatal. 
I write “potentially” because lawyers still have something to say about 
their future, even it is only on the margins.  But to speak into the future, 
we need to answer a more fundamental question about who we are in the 
present and who we are as professionals.  Can we still serve as trusted 
counselors who help clients look beyond themselves, not despite their best 
interests, but in service to their best interests?  If this idea can still gain 
traction in today’s profession, we could do worse than look to King as a 
model. 
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